In February, as rumours of the ambitions of Congress president Sonia 
Gandhi’s son-in-law swirled amidst the heat and dust of the election 
campaign in Uttar Pradesh, her daughter Priyanka moved to scotch 
speculation about Robert Vadra’s possible political future.
“He’s a successful businessman,” the younger Ms. Gandhi said of her 
husband, “who is not interested in changing his occupation.” 
Even though Mr. Vadra has increasingly emerged in the public eye, there 
has been little information on just how successful a businessman he is —
 and how his empire was built. 
Last year, The Economic Times first wrote about his “low-key 
entry into the real estate business” with the help of DLF Ltd, India’s 
largest commercial property developer. And on Friday, Arvind Kejriwal 
and Prashant Bhushan of India Against Corruption (IAC) released 
documents which showed how Mr. Vadra has acquired land assets in and 
around the National Capital Region worth hundreds of crores of rupees, 
sometimes at prices below market value — funded by interest-free loans 
disbursed to him by DLF and other companies for no apparent reason. 
Though the documents reveal no illegality or impropriety on the part of 
Mr. Vadra, they do raise the question of why DLF — which is a publicly 
traded company — would enter into multiple business transactions with him on terms that appear highly preferential. The company on Saturday issued a lengthy press release
 setting out its side of the story but questions of corporate governance
 remain and minority shareholders are likely to ask the company for the 
rationale behind its arrangement with Ms. Sonia Gandhi’s son-in-law and 
whether similar soft loans (or “advances” as DLF prefers to call them) 
and deals have been transacted with companies owned by other prominent 
individuals. The answer to the second question may help explain why a 
normally feisty Opposition has been remarkably silent on the DLF-Vadra 
connection since the story first broke in 2011. 
In 1997, the year Mr. Vadra married Priyanka Gandhi, he incorporated his
 first, modest business — Artex, which dealt with brass handicrafts and 
fashion accessories. From 2007, there was a surge in his activities. 
Inside of a year, he founded five other ventures, spanning the real 
estate, hospitality and trading sectors. 
Ms. Gandhi maintained a distance from these companies: in 2008, she 
dissociated herself from the sole business in which she was involved, 
aircraft charter firm Blue Breeze Trading. 
From balance sheets and directors’ reports released by IAC and additional papers obtained by The Hindu,
 which relate to six group companies, it is clear that Mr. Vadra’s rise 
was meteoric. In 2007-2008, his companies started out with promoter 
funds of just Rs. 50 lakh. 
However, the companies succeeded in acquiring 29 high-value properties 
by 2010, armed with loans and advances of Rs. 80 crore from DLF,… as 
well as Bedarwals Infra Projects, Nikhil International and VRS 
Infrastructure. These included a Rs. 31.7 crore acquisition of a 50 per 
cent share of Saket Courtyard by 2010, armed with loans and advances of 
Rs. 80 crore from DLF, as well as Bedarwals Infra Projects, Nikhil 
International and VRS Infrastructure. 
These included a Rs. 31.7 crore acquisition of a 50 per cent share of 
Saket Courtyard Hospitality, which owns the 114-bed Hilton Garden Hotel in
 New Delhi; a 10,000 square foot penthouse, number B1115, at the DLF 
Aralias complex for Rs 89.41 lakh; 7 apartments in DLF Magnolia for Rs. 
5.2 crore; apartments for Rs. 5.06 crore at DLF Capital Greens; and a 
DLF-owned plot in Delhi’s ultra-posh Greater Kailash II area for Rs. 
1.21 crore. Though DLF’s press release said some of these prices were 
“completely incorrect,” the investment numbers are all stated in the 
balance sheets filed by Mr. Vadra’s companies with the Registrar of 
Companies. 
Then, at the end of 2010, Mr. Vadra’s companies also picked up a bouquet
 of rural properties: 160.62 acres of agricultural land in Bikaner for 
Rs. 1.02 crore, and Rs. 2.43 crore for an additional 5 parcels of land 
of unknown acreage; land at Manesar, on Delhi’s fringes, for Rs. 15.38 
crore; land at Palwal for Rs. 42 lakh, land at Hayyatpur, in Gurgaon, 
for roughly Rs. 4 crore; land at Hasanpur for Rs. 76.07 lakh; land at 
Mewat for Rs. 95.42 lakh; unidentified agricultural land for Rs. 69.09 
lakh; and two ‘other real estate bookings’ worth Rs. 9 lakh. 
From just Rs. 7.95 crore in fiscal 2008, Vadra’s fixed assets and 
investments grew to Rs 17.18 crore in fiscal 2009, jumping a staggering 
350 per cent in a single year to Rs 60.53 crore in fiscal 2010, the year
 in which most of these properties were acquired with promoter funds of 
just Rs. 50 lakh along with interest of Rs. 255.46 lakh earned on 
advances and loans and zero group activity or profitability. 
Despite the high market value of these listed assets (properties), 
though, the declared investment portfolio in Mr. Vadra’s balance sheets 
remained a meagre Rs. 71 crore at the end of fiscal 2010 with 
accumulated group losses of Rs. 3 crore. 
Mr. Vadra’s companies did not respond to e-mails sent by The Hindu 
seeking clarifications on the details of these transactions. In 
particular, it remains unclear why DLF and other major corporations 
would have made him large loans, since this is not in the nature of 
their business. Nor did Mr. Vadra’s companies have any apparent prior 
specialisation in real estate business. 
Financial wizardry
The financial information available from the balance sheets and 
directors’ reports of Mr. Vadra’s companies — Sky Light Hospitality, Sky
 Light Realty, Blue Breeze Trading, Artex, Real Earth Estates and North 
India IT Parks — raise hard questions about what business it is they 
actually do, and how this business is conducted. 
Each of the companies has 268, Sukhdev Vihar, New Delhi, as its common 
address, and Mr. Vadra and his mother Maureen Vadra as directors. Mr. 
Vadra, the documents show, receives remuneration of Rs. 60 lakh per 
annum from just one company, Sky Light Realty. The payment, the 
company’s auditor states is “remuneration in excess of the limit 
prescribed under section 217 (2A) of the Companies Act, 1956 read with 
the Companies (Particulars of Employees) Rules 1975.” 
There are no other employee costs in the books, either to his mother or 
to others. However, in the documents, both directors “place on record 
their deep sense of appreciation for the committed services of 
executives, staff and workers of the company.” 
Strangely, while assets balloon in each subsequent balance sheet, there 
is no account of the corresponding enhancement of visible business 
activity. For example, the balance sheets raise a current liability of 
Rs. 50 crore against the Manesar land, though it was registered for just
 Rs.15.38 crore in the same financial year, defying all commercial and 
financial prudence and raising doubts about whether this was an income 
rather than a current liability. 
A senior chartered accountant told The Hindu on condition of anonymity, 
given the individuals involved, that masking incomes as loans/current 
liabilities in this manner is an unorthodox accounting device. “Using 
short term funding of this kind to create long-term assets defies 
financial prudence as it constitutes a high business risk, unless they 
are not really ‘current liabilities’ and are not payable in the short 
term, which means they are nothing but incomes which have been 
disguised,” he said. Vadra’s auditors consistently overlook this in all 
six firms, while accounting firm Khurana & Khurana in its Auditors 
Report for Real Earth Estates Pvt. Ltd. for the year 2010, actually opts
 to gloss over this by stating: “Based on the information and 
explanation given to and on an overall examination of the balance sheet 
of the company, in our opinion, there are no funds raised on short term 
basis which have been used for long term investment.” 
The auditor’s accounting rigor comes into further question with its 
statement that according to the information and explanations given to 
us, the company has, during the year, not granted any loans, secured or 
unsecured to companies, firm or other parties covered in the register 
maintained under section 31 of the Companies Act 1956, excepting the 
advances under business obligation accordingly paragraphs 4 (iii) (a) 
(b) (c) and (d) of the order are not applicable. However, the balance 
sheet shows loans and advances of Rs 2.89 crore for the company in 2010.
 
Many such loans, which reflect as total current liability of Rs. 72 
crore in the accounts, are invested in long-term assets like land. 
Curiously, no one appears to be pressing for the return of these loans —
 which are, according to the documents, interest-free. 
Additionally, all of Mr. Vadra’s companies show interest income from 
fixed deposits, claiming tax deducted at source for this interest 
without accounting for the fixed deposits themselves in the balance 
sheets. The six companies’ profitability, which grew from zero in 2007-8
 to Rs. 20.94 lakh in 2008-9 to Rs. 255.46 lakh in 2009-10, was not from
 any business activity in these companies but purely from interest on 23
 elusive fixed deposits amounting to roughly Rs. 5 crore. 
There are other unexplained gaps in the financial information. As of 
March 31, 2010, the group profit and loss account shows that only Sky 
Light Realty made a profit, and that too in one single year. Yet, while 
the others show losses, they continue to make investments. This profit 
of Rs. 244.98 lakh was despite a complete absence of business activity 
or liquidation/reduction of fixed assets, investments or other bookings.
 However, the accumulated losses of Rs. 3 crore from the other 5 firms 
in the RV Group’s 2010 balance sheet wipe out Vadra’s capital and 
reserves, raising questions about his ability to buy so many high value 
properties with zero capital. 
DLF’s fortunes
Perhaps the key to the relationship could lie in DLF’s troubled fortunes
 since 2008 — the very time its dealings with Mr. Vadra acquired 
significant scale. According to a March 1, 2012 report by the respected 
Veritas Investment Research Corporation, DLF Ltd is an organisation 
under duress, with its management scrambling to consummate assets sales,
 rationalize its land bank and divest non-core operations. 
Since a May, 2007 Initial Public Offering, which sold at Rs. 525 per 
share, the stock price declined by 46 per cent in March 2012 compared to
 a roughly 30 per cent gain in the Sensex over the same period with the 
stock presently trading at Rs. 241.80, a steep 54.13 per cent dip. 
Veritas points to questionable related-party transactions, aggressive 
and conflicting accounting policies, self-enrichment and inability to 
deliver on promises, and a balance sheet stretched to the limit, with no
 free cash flow and no credible plan to de-lever its balance sheet. “If 
your investment decision incorporates management integrity, then 
bypassing DLF will be an easy choice,” the Veritas report states. 
In addition, Veritas does “not believe the disclosed book equity and 
asset base of the company,” stating that via its dealings (merger) with 
DLF Assets Ltd (DAL), from FY 2007 to FY 2011, the company inflated 
sales by at least Rs. 11,236 crore and its profit before tax by Rs. 
7,233 crore. 
A slowing real estate market in a high inflation environment and 
over-exposure to Gurgaon — among India’s most speculative real estate 
markets — is further expected to create tremendous pressure on the 
company’s balance sheet. “In the end, we believe DLF will seek 
assistance from financial institutions to restructure its loans,” the 
report affirms, urging investors not to buy DLF stock. DLF dismissed the
 report as “mischievous and presumptive.” 
Mr. Vadra himself has attributed his brass-to-gold success story to hard
 work—and a little help from “family” friends like K.P. Singh, the 
chairman of the DLF Group. However, Mr. Vadra has strongly denied taking
 any favours from DLF in the past. “I have a good understanding with 
DLF. Our children are friends, we are friends. They are seasoned 
businessmen. They are not daft… They don't need me to enhance them. 
They’ve existed for years,” he told The Economic Times in March 2011. 
Indeed, in January 2002, he made his distaste for favour-seeking 
capitalism public, dissociating himself from his brother and father, 
alleging that they were promising jobs and favours using his name and 
association with the Gandhi family. His father responded by suing him 
for defamation. 
Hard work Mr. Vadra may well have put into building his property empire.
 But the help he received from friends like DLF suggests at least a part
 of his success flowed from the willingness of others to bet on the 
outcome of his enterprise. 
 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/behind-robert-vadras-fortune-a-maze-of-questions/article3975214.ece?homepage=true

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